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EDITORIAL
 
The Roman Catholic church, and the hermeneutics of race, as two contexts 
for African philosophy 
 
 
 
Volume XIX of Quest (2005) brings the journal up to date again. Its compo-
sition is again somewhat kaleidoscopic, with a fair selection of the general 
topics as defined in the 2004 Editorial. However, the contents converge 
around two topics:  
 
• the prominence of the Roman Catholic church in African philosophy, 
and  
• the hermeneutics of race. 
 
Given the possibilities of misunderstanding, and the serious effects that such 
misunderstanding might have, we feel the need to devote extensive initial 
discussion to these topics, in the present Editorial.  
 
The Roman Catholic church and philosophy in Africa 
 
If it is true to say that academic philosophy in Africa has developed in the 
course of the twentieth century CE in critical exchange with North Atlantic 
counterparts, then the present volume illustrates one major context in which 
such exchanges have taken place: that of Christianity as a world religion. 
Here the example of St. Augustine, bishop of the North African town of 
Hippo (now Annaba, in eastern Algeria) suffices to show the long ancestry 
of this triadic connection between Africa, philosophy and Christianity. Espe-
cially the fact that the Roman Catholic church, as a universalising global 
organisation, made a considerable number of African male clergy go through 
the same formal training as elsewhere in the world, including two years of 
philosophical training, has created a considerable platform for philosophy in 
Africa.  
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 To this institutional arrangement we owe, directly or indirectly, some of 
the great names of African philosophy, such as Abbé Alexis Kagame, and 
Valentin Mudimbe, once a Benedictine monk and now one of the leading 
African intellectuals world-wide. Even though Mudimbe lost his faith and 
became a fierce critic of the hegemonic micropolitics (Foucault) of Roman 
Catholic education in Africa in his generation, he still considers the phase of 
‘clerical intellectualism’1 as ‘an incomprehensible miracle’, since (in 
Mudimbe’s opinion) that was the context, largely, of the modern intellectual 
and spiritual mutation of Central Africa towards modernity and post-
modernity. Part of that mutation – which for Mudimbe was effectively a 
‘liberation of [African] difference’ vis-à-vis the dominant White expatriate 
clergy – consisted in the strategy of retrodiction. Retrodiction meant that 
African priests, who in fact had no other spiritual home left than global 
Christianity, still experimented with the recapture of the historic African 
world-view and religion, as – presumably – it had been in pre-colonial and 
pre-mission times. In Mudimbe’s case, retrodiction, as a search for African 
historic religion and African self-affirmation, largely gave way to the agnos-
tic universalism of scholarship – an intellectual stance which – for Mudimbe 
– no longer has much room for African historic religion, and which, how-
ever homeless in the last analysis, in the world today seems most at home in 
the North Atlantic region.  
 It is has been QUEST’s great good fortune that Valentin Mudimbe himself 
has been prepared to share his personal view on these and related matters in 
our opening piece, his recent essay ‘An African Practice of Philosophy: A 
Personal Testimony’.  
 In other African cases, however, the tension between Roman Catholicism 
and African historic religion was often resolved in a very different direction. 
Thus after decades of adamant rejection of historic local forms of ritual 
practice, Roman Catholicism has sometimes become the very locus for the 
                                                          
1 Mudimbe, V.Y., 1997, Tales of faith: Religion as political performance in Central 
Africa: Jordan Lectures 1993, London & Atlantic Highlands: Athlone Press; van 
Binsbergen, Wim M.J., 2005, ‘ ‘‘An incomprehensible miracle’’ – Central African 
clerical intellectualism versus African historic religion: A close reading of Valentin 
Mudimbe’s Tales of Faith’, in: Kai Kresse, ed., Reading Mudimbe, special issue of the 
Journal of African Cultural Studies, 17, 1, June 2005: 11-65; also at: 
http://www.shikanda.net/african_religion/mudil0.htm .  
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incorporation and continuation of local tradition (e.g. music, dance, puberty 
rites, funerary rites) in the modern African context – however great a price 
of format change, meaning change, and partial or total loss of African con-
trol had to be paid in the process. And even in the articulation and preserva-
tion – again, with a fundamental format change – of African historic 
philosophy (such as informed world-views, ritual and judicial practices, and 
everyday life, in pre-modern contexts), the Roman Catholic church and its 
officers have played a considerable though controversial role. The latter 
point is aptly illustrated by the case (however much contested) of Placide 
Tempels, the Flemish missionary who, in 1945,2 published an account of the 
Luba world view. This marked the beginnings of African academic philoso-
phy and hence has constituted a baseline to which African philosophers (also 
in the Quest context) have frequently returned, usually critically, even con-
temptuously – as was unavoidable and necessary given the colonial and 
postcolonial politics of knowledge. Yet for someone personally familiar with 
the world view of the Luba and related peoples,3 that cosmology is still 
highly recognisable through Tempels’ account, even if unmistakably influ-
enced by Thomism as the philosophical template most familiar to him.4 Still, 
                                                          
2 Tempels, Placide, 1955, Bantoe-filosofie, Antwerpen: De Sikkel, first published 1946; 
translated in French (1945, Lovania: a French translation to appear before the Dutch 
original), Lingala, English, German, etc.  
3 From the early 1970s to the mid-1990s the present writer conducted anthropological 
and historical fieldwork among the Nkoya people of western central Zambia, whose 
language and culture are very close to those of the Luba. A fragment of the Luba ethnic 
group, specifically under that name, is found in the same region. Cf. Brelsford, W.V., 
1965, The tribes of Zambia, Lusaka: Government Printer, 2nd ed., first edition 1956; 
Smith, E.W., & A.M. Dale, 1920, The Ila-speaking peoples of Northern Rhodesia, 2 
vols., London: Macmillan; van Binsbergen, W.M.J., 1992, Tears of Rain: Ethnicity and 
history in central western Zambia, London/Boston: Kegan Paul International.  
4 Mudimbe, in his contribution to QUEST below, adduces two other possible philosophical 
sources of Tempels: the 14th century CE Flemish mystic Jan van Ruysbroeck, and (at the 
suggestion of the American anthropologist Ivan Karp) the early 20th century CE French 
philosopher Bergson.  
 The medieval reference revolves on Mudimbe’s adoption of Smet’s (a present-day 
Belgian author) comments on van Ruysbroeck’s expression de honger der weet-
gierigheid. This obsolete and syntactically unusual Dutch/Flemish phrase can be decoded 
to mean, precisely ‘that particular kind of hunger that consists, not in a craving for mate-
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half a century later, we see a prominent codifier of Southern African ubuntu 
philosophy, such as Mogobe Ramose, emerge as a product of, inter alia, a 
thoroughly Roman Catholic spirituality and education, crowned (not unlike 
Mudimbe’s early career) with a doctorate from Louvain, Belgium. And in a 
very similar bracket is Achille Mbembe,5 who counted forms of African 
Roman Catholicism among his Afriques indociles (‘Recalcitrant Africas’), 
and whose critique of the African postcolony features (with Mudimbe) in the 
present volume in the article by Carolien Ceton. In addition to priests, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rial food, but in a desire for knowledge’. The genitive construction (der) is basically in 
the nature of an unusual embellishment for emphasis, for weetgierigheid in itself covers 
the same semantic field – with the same lexical element geer-, gier- that in other contexts 
has produced begeerte (‘desire’), gierigheid (nowadays: ‘avarice’), and the famous Geert 
Geertsen’s Humanistic pen name Desiderius Erasmus. The equation of ‘knowledge’ with 
‘truth’ is not given with the Dutch/Flemish phrasing itself, and derives from Smet’s 
understanding of medieval mystical Christian usage. Mudimbe suggests a convergence 
between the Christian mystic’s search for direct communion with divine truth, and a 
notion of dynamic, initiatory progress which Tempels understood to underlie the Luba 
world-view, and which was subsequently built into the Jamaa Christian movement in 
Congo. Here a consideration of historic religious forms of Congo could have been illumi-
nating. It would have suggested a contrast between initiation into a specific cult or into 
adulthood (where the novice is certainly ushered into new knowledge that transforms the 
person – but not primarily out of the novice’s own impetus and desire but out of the 
initiated elders taking the initiative for the novice’s transition, extending their privileged 
access to the novice) and the nganga’s (traditional practitioner), and nganga’s appren-
tice’s, quest for knowledge, which revolves on their personal agency in the deliberate 
desire for esoteric knowledge.  
 Secondly, Mudimbe argues the implausibility of Bergsonian thought penetrating to 
Roman Catholic Major Seminaries in Flanders in the 1920s (when Tempels studied 
there), or of such vitalism otherwise finding its way into Tempels’ intellectual baggage – 
despite the correspondences in terminology between Bergson’s elan vital, and the ‘life 
force’ which features prominently in Tempels’ representation of the Luba world-view. 
Mudimbe’s command of the intellectual history of the Belgium clergy in the first half of 
the twentieth century is impressive. Yet his negative assessment on this point may be 
reconsidered in the light of the absolute sway Bergson held over continental Western 
European philosophical life in the first decades of the 20th century. For that period, for 
instance, Bergson’s influence in Roman Catholic clerical circles is clear from the case of 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955), one generation above Tempels, but, of course, in 
a francophone environment.  
5 Mbembe, A., 1988, Afriques indociles: Christianisme, pouvoir et Etat en société post-
coloniale, Paris: Karthala. 
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seminary – in Africa just as much as elsewhere – has always produced a 
large spill-over of dropouts who carried their relatively superior education, 
even when unfinished, to academic, administrative and political careers 
outside the church organisation, and often even outside the circle of Catholic 
believers.  
 Once more we are reminded how limited, and how potentially hege-
monic, it is to adopt an exclusively North Atlantic perspective upon global 
knowledge production, in general, and a fortiori in relation to Africa. For the 
idea of the Roman Catholic church serving as one of the principal loci of 
philosophy in Africa is ironic, not to say embarrassing, from the perspective 
of North Atlantic philosophy today. The latter is saturated with the anti-
clerical heritage of the Enlightenment, and with the subsequent secularisa-
tion of North Atlantic society in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries 
CE. In this connection one would associate Roman Catholicism rather with 
the management of the scholastic, especially the Thomistic, medieval tradi-
tion (with its enormous influence on Catholic theology and on Catholic 
thought in general), than with the current production of a philosophy cater-
ing for the challenges of the modern world. These challenges, world-wide, 
urge us to forge philosophical tools for articulating the contemporary experi-
ence (characterised by globalisation and commodification, technology, 
homelessness, the erosion of modernity and its state-centred political forms, 
the hectic proliferation and contestation of identities, and the rising tide of 
inequality, violence, and North American military hegemony); to define 
elements of meaning therein – if any; and to ethically direct our action. In 
this vital connection, the Roman Catholic church has largely relied, not so 
much on topical philosophy, but on church doctrine and ritual sub specie 
aeternitatis. The dilemma is sketched by the caricature of octogenarian 
Princes of the Church, at the end of a celibate life, officiating on such fram-
ing of human sexuality as rubber technology has made possible and as the 
absolutely devastating HIV epidemic has made imperative, especially in 
Africa. 
 Even so, the twentieth century has produced many prominent philoso-
phers of a Roman Catholic signature. The names come to mind of Edith 
Stein, Alexis Kagame, Gabriel Marcel, Karl Rahner, Jacques Maritain, Pi-
erre Teilhard de Chardin, John F. Crosby, Jean-Luc Marion, Karol Woytila 
(more commonly known as the late Pope John-Paul II), Etienne Gilson, 
7 
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Richard Kearney, Bernard Delfgaauw, Dietrich von Hildebrand, among 
many others.  
 And, albeit without quite aiming for that league of intercontinental play-
ers, the present volume of Quest confirms the prominence of Roman Ca-
tholicism in the African production of philosophy. Thanks to the generosity 
of the Editor of the Italian journal Africa e Mediterraneo (for Africanist and 
Mediterranean studies), and of the author himself who immediately re-
sponded favourably to QUEST’s reprinting request, we have an article by 
Valentin Mudimbe, as, perhaps, a post-Catholic. Moreover, the Jesuit Father 
Jean-Luc Malango Kitungano writes on Habermas, the civil society and the 
state in a way that promises African relevance. In a soul-searching contribu-
tion, Father Alozie Oliver Onwubiko, for several years co-director of the 
famous Bigard seminary in Central Nigeria, considers the dilemmas of cul-
tural juxtaposition (imported European culture versus African traditional 
culture).  
 
• Instead of allowing himself to be caught in a racially-defined African 
counter-culture,  
• nor following the lure of universalism à la Appiah and Howe6 (one 
might have added: Mudimbe) – a universalism that has little, or no, 
time for ‘parochial’ African sensitivities in the identitary domain,  
• Onwubiko suggests a third possibility: that African Christianity may 
well constitute a suitable domain to overcome the juxtaposition and to 
develop a cultural dialogue towards biculturalism, and ultimately 
transculturalism, in which also the African religious tradition will find 
its place.  
 
To complete this series of clerical and post-clerical philosophers, in the 
section Quest Laboratory, the philosopher Abbé Louis Mpala Mbabula, 
from Congo-Kinshasa, offers us sizzlingly spectacular polemical fireworks 
                                                          
6 Cf. Appiah, K.A., 1992, In my father’s house: Africa in the philosophy of culture, New 
York & London: Oxford University Press; Appiah, K.A., 1993, “Europe Upside Down: 
Fallacies of the New Afrocentrism”, Times Literary Supplement (London), 12 February, 
24-25; Howe, S., 1999, Afrocentrism: Mythical pasts and imagined homes, London/New 
York: Verso; first published in 1998. The reference in footnote 1 above discusses 
Mudimbe’s universalism.  
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devoted to the specific philosophy of science that was developed by his 
colleague Frédéric-Bienvenu Mabasi Bakana, – enough to show that despite 
political and economic hardships, philosophy is still alive and kicking in that 
country.  
 
 
Jacques Derrida 
 
In a volume where the contradictory presence of Roman Catholicism as a 
world religion and a self-styled guardian of philosophy is so unmistakable, 
the need may be felt for a totally different philosophical perspective on relig-
ion. On October 8, 2004, Jacques Derrida died of cancer in a Paris hospital 
at the age of 74. His death marks the end of one of the most significant phi-
losophical careers of the twentieth century. Born in Al-Biar, a residential 
area in the south of Algiers, Algeria, in 1930, from a Jewish family, he is in 
space and time an amazing counterpart to St. Augustine, and – strictly 
speaking – another great philosophical son of Africa. Derrida’s explicit 
influence on African philosophy has been slight so far – although there are 
considerable Derridean parallels in Mudimbe’s work, which may not all be 
attributable, indirectly, to these two philosophers having been similarly 
exposed to the Paris intellectual milieu of the 1960s. However, Derrida’s 
thought on deconstruction, difference/ différance, presence and logocentric-
ity, and more recently on religion, hospitality and terrorism, has contributed 
enormously to the development of a philosophical ‘toolkit’ with which we 
can approach the globalising world today in its complexity, its identity 
struggles and its violence, and in which, particularly, issues of intercultural-
ity can be articulated. Hence the inclusion of Wim van Binsbergen’s article 
on Derrida and religion. 
  
 
Race, Afrocentricity, and African philosophy 
 
Let us now turn to the second, potentially even more controversial, topic of 
this volume, ‘race’.  
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 Teodros Kiros, professor of Africana Philosophy at Brown University 
and Du Bois fellow at Harvard University, both in the United States of 
America, deals with the role of Africa in the thought of one of the most 
seminal of Afrocentrist writers of the first half of the twentieth century, 
W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-1963) – as a stepping-stone to what to some Quest 
readers will come almost as an uninvited guest, notably, a systematic phi-
losophy of race.  
 Again on race is Sanya Osha’s positive and enthusiastic assessment of 
the work of Pierre-Joseph Salazar on South Africa, so that at least two of the 
three co-editors of Quest volume XVI on Truth in Politics come together 
again in this edition.  
 Almost as a more general, theoretical rider to these two reflections on 
race, Carolien Ceton presents a philosophical approach to identity as evolut-
ive, based on an examination of the work of four philosophers as diverse as 
de Beauvoir, Mbembe, Mudimbe and Taylor. Much in the same way, Ta-
tashikanda Kahare’s review of the recent collective volume Is violence inevi-
table in Africa? suggests that intercultural complementarity and critical 
collaboration between African and North Atlantic identitary positions (in 
other words, a colour-blind, somatically indifferent approach) may lead us 
to insights in African matters of vital importance today. Similar South-North 
complementarity in the construction of African knowledge is revealed in the 
two reviews by Sanya Osha that conclude this volume.  
 How could a philosophy of race represent an ‘uninvited guest’ to part of 
the Quest readership? We consider it our responsibility as Editor to elabo-
rate, especially since our publishing the contributions by Professors Kiros 
and Osha means that Quest fully endorses the academic stature of these two 
papers and their authors. Does that mean that Quest now invites open discus-
sion in terms of ‘race’, as if ‘race’ were no longer a historically polluted, no 
longer an academically unusable word? No, it does not mean that. This jour-
nal encourages critical debate on the apparent or unmistakable racism of 
others; it would be irresponsible to try and avoid such debate in the African 
context to which Quest emphatically belongs. However, this journal will not, 
under the present Editorship, be open to explicitly racialist arguments in 
their own right.  
 Let us recapitulate the relevant history of ideas, which in this case –as so 
often – may reveal the politics of knowledge of North Atlantic hegemonism. 
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As uninvited guests violently breaking such laws of hospitality as also ob-
tained in their own countries of origin at the time, European, Asian and 
North African intruders extended a regime of slavery and slave trade to the 
sub-Saharan African lands they visited, at various times in the course of the 
last two millennia, and possibly already much earlier. In early Modern times 
(from c. 1500 CE onwards), early imperialism, Mercantilism and the subse-
quent colonial conquest of Africa needed, and invented, racism. In the hands 
of theoreticians of race such as Blumenbach (1752-1840) and de Gobineau 
(1816-1882),7 European racism’s obsession with skin pigmentation, nasal 
and skull architecture, hair texture, and the shape of buttocks and genitals, 
did the trick of conceptually expelling large sections of defenceless and 
exploitable humans to outside the category of common humanity. And who-
ever finds herself outside that category, can – like an animal – be hunted, 
appropriated, raped, put to unpaid work, sold, and killed, at will and with 
impunity, by all those whose membership of the full human category went, 
apparently, uncontested (although, inevitably, their own membership be-
comes liable to contestation by virtue of their very thoughts and acts of ra-
cism). The mental construct of racialist exclusion from humanity sufficed to 
justify (albeit only subjectively, and only for the time being) crimes against 
humanity that would scarcely have been tolerated in the respective homes of 
these traders and colonialists, outside Africa – except, when the heyday of 
colonialism was already over, in Nazi Germany from the late 1930s to 1945; 
then the victims were not Africans but Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals and 
mentally retarded people.  
 When Africans, and their descendants the world over, began to confront 
racism in their writings and their political activism, they did so as long-
standing victims of racism who sought to regain, and celebrate, dignity and 
                                                          
7 As is well-known but – until recently – little discussed, the founders of modern Western 
philosophy, Kant (1724-1804) and Hegel (1770-1831), made considerable contributions 
to the construction of North Atlantic racism; cf. Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi, 1997, ‘The 
Color of Reason: The Idea of “Race” in Kant’s Anthropology’, in: Eze, Emmanuel 
Chukwudi, ed., Postcolonial African philosophy: A critical reader, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 103-
140; Bernal, M., 1987, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, I, The 
Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1787-1987, London: Free Association Books/ New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press; Poliakov, L., 1971, Le mythe aryen, Paris: Calmann-Lévy; and Idowu 
in QUEST XVIII, 2004.  
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freedom. Understandably, the language of anti-racism was initially predi-
cated on the central concept of race, and went through a phase when the 
proud affirmation of African somatic traits had to put an end to Blacks’ 
internalised self-negation imposed by Whites’ racism (in ways explained by 
Fanon, and Sartre). Du Bois, Césaire, Senghor, and others of their genera-
tions, could still phrase both their indignation, and their affirmation of self-
respect, in terms of race. For a long time, the discourse of race continued to 
appear as the most obvious way to articulate socio-economic inequality, 
exclusion, and the desire for emancipation.  
 However, the period when ‘race’ could naïvely be invoked as if it were a 
neutral, universal and self-evident category, has ended sometime during the 
second half of the 20th century. This shift in discourse was a consequence of 
the very success of the anti-colonial and anti-racial struggle, in Africa, as 
well as in American, Asian, and Oceanian former colonies, – aided by the 
global human-rights movement extending over more than two centuries, and 
more recently (from the 1940s onward) by the rise of cultural relativism in 
the social sciences and philosophy. These developments have combined, 
from the 1930s onward, with the demolition of the ‘scientific’ racial edifice 
by scientists (geneticists, other human biologists, psychologists, anthropol-
ogists, political scientists), relegating racism to pseudo-scientific status 
(‘man’s most dangerous myth’ – Ashley Montague),8 and with the philoso-
phical reflection on the dehumanising implications of racism both in the 
colonial and in the Nazi context.  
 Today, the United States of America is (along with South Africa) one of 
the few countries in the world where the concept of race has continued to be 
part of polite and sophisticated conversation and of official bureaucratic 
parlance – where the social construction of ‘race’ (not as a disreputable 
exploitative ideology or an obsolete, patently exposed pseudo-scientific 
illusion, but as a widely endorsed ‘reality’ – as a ‘collective representation’ – 
Durkheim) has survived into the late 20th, even the 21st century. This has 
special reasons to which I will shortly turn. Meanwhile, and regrettably, the 
hegemony which the United States of America has claimed in terms of mili-
tary, scientific and media control during the last few decades, has created a 
                                                          
8 Montagu, A. (M.F. Ashley Montagu), 1945, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy 
of Race. New York: Columbia University Press, first published 1942. 
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situation where the collective representations informing everyday life in 
North American society today, have gained an enormous impact on the per-
ceptions and aspirations of people outside the United States of America. 
This includes people in Africa, and also in Western Europe. In the latter 
region, the massive influx of intercontinental immigrants, also in the course 
of the last few decades, has created socio-economic, cultural, religious and 
political tensions for which the concept of ‘race’ provides, once more, a 
ready (if naïve, muddled, deceptive, and dangerous) shorthand expression.  
 Despite the multifarious and intercontinental criticism of the term, ‘race’ 
has been able to survive as an apparently neutral, civilised concept in 
American society, and thus as a collective representation, because, for sev-
eral centuries (ever since the beginning of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and 
the plantation economy in the southern States), blatant socio-economic con-
tradictions in that country have happened to coincide with Black-White 
somatic contrasts, thus acerbating class relations into the almost inescapable 
oppositions of ‘colour castes’. Major, but (as the New Orleans hurricane 
disaster of 2005 has demonstrated) still only partial, improvements in that 
situation were effected with the abolition of slavery in the mid-19th century, 
and the civil rights movement as recently as the 1960s. Thus, whenever 
African Americans articulated their proud identity as Blacks and as Africans, 
they would do so in a context where an appeal to race was indicated, not 
only by their own group history of exclusion on somatic grounds, but also by 
the collective representation in terms of race as held throughout American 
society.  
 Among African American identitary expressions of the late twentieth 
century, Afrocentricity has been most vocal, immensely influential, and 
often intellectually impressive, combining an American intellectual and 
activist ancestry from Blyden, Du Bois, Booker Washington etc., with the 
Diopian philosophical and historical inspiration from Senegal – and, in the 
last two decades, finding additional support from established White intellec-
tuals engaging in the Black Athena debate which Martin Bernal had initiated. 
Afrocentrism came heavily under attack9 (most vocally from the part of the 
                                                          
9 Lefkowitz, M.R., & MacLean Rogers, G., eds, 1996, Black Athena revisited, Chapel 
Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press; Lefkowitz, M.R., 1996, Not out of 
Africa: How Afrocentrism became an excuse to teach myth as history, New York: Basic 
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classicist and – remarkably – feminist Mary Lefkowitz) in the mid-1990s. 
This was a period when the United States of America, in the course of the 
so-called Culture Wars, had to invent and cultivate its own internal enemies 
(such as militant and defiant African Americans), for the sake of internal 
national cohesion at the middle-class and upper-class level. For, in a way 
scarcely imaginable any more today, as far as foreign politics was concerned 
the United States of America found themselves ‘in between’ convincingly 
demonised external enemies in the 1990s:10 the ‘Cold War’ had ended in the 
collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989, and (despite the prelude, in the form 
of the First Gulf War) the ‘War on Terrorism’ was only to begin on ‘9/11’ 
2001. Not surprisingly, now that external enemies are back with a venge-
ance, the whole political topicality of Afrocentricity at the national level in 
the United States of America has subsided; the eagerly prepared manuscript 
of the American version of a major French denouncement of Afrocentricity11 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Books. In retrospect, one is inclined to see Mary Lefkowitz, not at all as the arch-enemy 
of Blacks which she has been made out to be, but as primarily a passionate but misguided 
scholar, who allowed her relentless insistence on technically impeccable scholarship (a 
quality in which the most vocal Afrocentrist writers, including Bernal, do not exactly 
excel), to eclipse her awareness of the wider political issues involved, as well as her 
awareness of the specific kinds of solidarity history imposes on intellectual producers 
today.  
10 Berlinerblau, J., 1999, Heresy in the University: The Black Athena controvery and the 
responsibilities of American intellectuals, New Brunswick etc.: Rutgers University Press. 
Incidentally, Berlinerblau shows considerable and deserving admiration for Bernal, yet he 
cannot refrain from pointing out the latter’s indebtedness to intellectual positions that had 
been held among African American intellectual for generations. This is why Berlinerblau 
jokingly characterises Bernal as ‘the intellectual Elvis’, sc. Presley, the latter being a 
‘White’ who gained fame by appropriating and transforming a ‘Black’ musical style.  
11 Fauvelle-Aymar, F.-X., Chrétien, J.-P., & Perrot, C.-H., 2000, eds., Afrocentrismes: 
L’histoire des Africains entre Égypte et Amérique, Paris: Karthala. Cf. Obenga, T., 2001, 
Le sens de la lutte contre l’afrocentrisme eurocentrisme, Gif-sur-Yvette (Cedex)/ Paris: 
Khepera/ L’Harmattan. Although we may appreciate Obenga’s Diopian theoretical posi-
tion, we may regret his sheer demonisation of the editors of Afrocentrismes. He showed 
himself incapable of any hermeneutical appreciation of their position. Like in the Lefko-
witz case, that position does not seem to be primarily inspired by siding with the forces of 
White hegemony (the North Atlantic scholars in question would scarcely recognise 
themselves in such a characterisation). Their attack on Afrocentrism was prompted by, 
once more, their (somewhat myopic and uncharitable) blind love for technically impec-
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is sitting idly on a shelf in Mary Lefkowitz’s office.  
 Not surprisingly, a major version of Afrocentrist thought plays, once 
more, the racial card, affirming identity, dignity and even historical seniority 
and superiority (‘Africa leads and Europe follows’, ‘Africa is the mother of 
all culture’) on the basis of a unique birthright that, presumably, the posses-
sion of (selected) African somatic traits would grant, but that could not be 
claimed in the absence of such traits. However, next to this ‘strong Afrocen-
tricity’ that claims a biological basis at the centre of its construction, there is 
also the other, ‘attenuated’ version of Afrocentricity, one where the unique 
and massive contribution of Africa to global cultural history is acknowl-
edged and documented, in the awareness that, since culture is by definition 
acquired not through the genes but by a learning process, these riches of 
African culture (just like the riches of other cultures in the world today) are 
in principle open to any human being regardless of somatic appearance, 
language, creed or gender – thus forming an integral part of the shared col-
lective heritage of humankind.  
 This emphatically non-racial version of Afrocentrism has much to rec-
ommend it,12 and much of it coincides with scientific insights that are widely 
held today. Since the first,13 still tentative and defective scientific formula-
tion of the ‘African Eve hypothesis’ nearly two decades ago, there is now 
almost global consensus among specialised scientists that Anatomically 
Modern Humans (a category to which all humans living today belong) did 
emerge in Africa c. 200,000 years BP (Before Present), and started on the 
Out-of-Africa Exodus only c. 140,000 BP, in a spatial movement probably 
spread out in time and involving, in total, about a thousand Africa-born 
                                                                                                                                                                             
cable scholarship, and by their self-righteous, hurt (but humanly understandable) insis-
tence on the integrity of their own particular love for Africa, which they (naïvely) consid-
ered beyond reproach, having devoted their entire scholarly life to it. The South-North 
politics of knowledge production on Africa are immensely complex and contradictory, 
and generate overwhelming emotions. We cannot do justice to this central problematic 
here, beyond voicing, once more, our convinction that South-North complementarity is, 
in the long run, the best strategy for valid, reliable and productive knowledge on Africa.  
12 Cf. van Binsbergen, W.M.J., ‘ ‘‘An incomprehensible miracle’’, o.c., and further 
references there.  
13 Cann, R.L., Stoneking, M. & Wilson, A.C., 1987, ‘Mitochondrial DNA and human 
evolution’, Nature, 325: 31-36. 
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women of reproductive age. Here we have solid, state-of-the-art genetic 
substantiation of the idea of Africa as our Mother – but mother, not only of 
people who today stand out as Blacks and Africans (which is, incidentally, a 
category displaying the greatest possible genetic variation), but literally of 
all of modern humankind. During c. 60,000 years, the whole of modern 
humankind shared an exclusively African history, was effectively African.  
 But the argument goes on. Many cultural (as well as somatic) traits were 
taken along on the Out-of-Africa Exodus, and recent comparative research 
into myths, into cultural near-universals, and into languages, now begins to 
allow us to identify and reconstruct fragments of the Out-of-Africa pack-
age.14 The Out-of-Africa Exodus started out for the other continents along 
two different routes:  
 
• the oldest and/or fastest one being due east along the Indian Ocean 
coast;  
• a later and/or slower one being due north into North Africa, West 
Asia, and subsequently east, north and west into Asia and Europe. 
 
In the course of over 100,000 years the package was increasingly diversified 
and gave rise to many prehistoric local cultures. It was in this period that the 
somatic differences arose now commonly associated with ‘race’; they are 
(on the time scale of species evolution) recent, less than skin-deep, and 
merely amount to physical adaptations to different ecozones. When and 
where the two ‘Out of Africa’ demographic and cultural movements col-
lided, the process of cultural and linguistic innovation and diversification 
was dramatically intensified. And finally, from perhaps 20,000 BP, certainly 
not later than 10,000 BP, a considerable return migration Back-into-Africa 
                                                          
14 van Binsbergen, W.M.J., 2005, ‘Mythological archaeology: reconstructing human-
kind’s oldest discourse: A preliminary attempt to situate sub-Saharan African cos-
mogonic myths within a long-range intercontinental comparative perspective’, paper for 
the comparative myth section of the Research Institute for Humanity and Nature (RIHN) 
Pre-Symposium / 7th ESCA Harvard-Kyoto Roundtable on ‘Ethnogenesis of South and 
Central Asia’, organised by RIHN, NIHU / Harvard University, the Department of San-
skrit and Indian Studies, Kyoto, Japan, 6-8 June, 2005; forthcoming in the conference 
proceedings now in press, and meanwhile available at: 
http://www.shikanda.net/ancient_models/mythical_archaeology/mytholog.htm .  
16 
The Roman Catholic Church, and race, as two contexts for philosophy in Africa 
took place.15 The latter brought back, to Africa, genes that had made the 
more than 100,000 years’ detour across Asia – many genes detectably mutat-
ing on the way. The Back-into-Africa return migration also brought back, 
into the African continent, cultural and linguistic innovations from Asia. 
These would now begin to percolate all over Africa (perhaps least so in a 
belt of varying width along the Atlantic coast from Sierra Leone to Angola), 
interacting – in a fascinating feed-back movement – with the many innova-
tions which the pre-Out-of-Africa package had meanwhile achieved inside 
the African continent. The latter innovations were highly significant: hu-
mankind’s oldest sophisticated hunting implements (barbed harpoons), geo-
metric art (the complex diamond-shaped geometrical pattern of Blombos 
Cave, South Africa), and representations of animals and humans (Tanzania), 
have all been attested in Africa, 90,000–40,000 BP. The result of all these 
developments has been: kaleidoscopic diversity yet unmistakable shared 
origins as well as more recent convergence on a truly intercontinental scale. 
Global cultural history emphatically includes Africa, but in this connection 
Africa has played  
 
• not just the passive role of receiver of cultural achievements coming 
in from the outside (as a condescending, potentially racialist North At-
lantic version of history had it),  
• nor exclusively the role of giver of cultural achievements, without re-
ceiving anything substantial from other continents (as the biologically 
entrenched, potential racialist strong version of Afrocentricity would 
have it) 
• but a combination of both roles of giver and receiver of cultural 
                                                          
15 Cf. Cavalli-Sforza, L.L., Piazza, A., & Menozzi, A., 1994, The history and geography 
of the human genes, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Cruciani, F., Santolamazza, 
P., Shen, P., Macaulay, V., Moral, P., Olckers, A., Modiano, D., Holmes, S., Destro-
Bisol, G., Coia, V., Wallace, D.C., Oefner, P.J., Torroni, A., Cavalli-Sforza, L.L., Scoz-
zari, R., Underhill, P.A., 2002, ‘A back migration from Asia to sub-Saharan Africa is 
supported by high-resolution analysis of human Y-chromosome haplotypes’, American 
Journal of Human Genetics, 70: 1197-1214; Hammer, M.F, Karafet T., Rasanayagam A., 
et al., 1998, ‘Out of Africa and back again: Nested cladistic analysis of human Y chromo-
some variation’, Molecular Biology and Evolution, 15, 4: 427-441; and references cited 
in these publications.  
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achievements, on the basis not of biological/ somatic/ genetic, but of 
non-somatic processes of cultural transmission through learning.  
 
 This, I propose – as an informed personal synthesis – is a possible con-
text in which to situate the debate on race in the context of African and 
Afrocentrist identity. It affirms Africa’s, and Africans’, absolutely crucial 
contribution to global cultural history, but does not make that claim depend-
ent on the exclusive, and accidental, possession of such genetically transmit-
ted somatic traits as are commonly associated with ‘race’; and (in ways 
remarkably convergent with Kwame Appiah’s argument on race – however, 
this is precisely the line of thought that is dismissed in Kiros’ contribution 
below!) it emphatically separates the sociology and the hermeneutics of race 
as a collective representation, from the kaleidoscopic minutiae of human-
kind’s minor somatic variations and ecological adaptations in the course of 
the last 140,000 years.  
  
Thus, when Teodros Kiros proposes a Du Boisean philosophy of race, this 
does not necessarily amount to a plea for the strong version of racially-
inclined Afrocentricity as defined above, and least of all is it an attempt at 
reviving de Gobineau. It is simply an invitation to join him, and Du Bois, in 
their magnificent and deeply moving hermeneutical quest for the meaning of 
‘race’ – race as a collective representation (shared by both Whites and 
Blacks) of American society during Du Bois’ life time. In this quest, Kiros, 
Du Bois, and the reader may join hands in recapturing the resources of cul-
ture and dignity that the experience of White racism had sought to deny 
them by forcibly making them members of an almost inescapable colour 
caste. And when Sanya Osha deals with race in his discussion of Philippe-
Joseph Salazar’s work on South Africa, it is not in order to reify the concept 
of race, but, on the contrary, because Salazar in his modern application of 
Aristotelian rhetoric (as a communicative technique of making the political 
desirable) offers16 a perspective liberating us from the pernicious reification 
of race – not as an objective scientific datum but as a man-made, deceptive, 
and manipulable collective representation.  
 
                                                          
16 Such is Osha’s reading; cf. Quest XVI: 238-272.  
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The purpose of this (I admit) unusually lengthy, substantive and personal 
Editorial was not to dictate a particular view, but to explicitly identify fields 
of possible misunderstanding, to adduce additional background information, 
and to invite members of the QUEST constituency to make their own contri-
butions to the ongoing debate; Philosophical Discussions was once the apt 
subtitle of this journal, so please live up to it, by producing, and submitting 
to QUEST, critical responses on the matter of race and on all other topics of 
interest to philosophy in Africa today.  
 
 
Wim van Binsbergen 
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